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ABSTRACT
A SUPPLY SIDE LIMITED PARTICIPATION MODEL OF MONETARY
TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
Karaca, Zeynal
MA, Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Dr. Erdem Basci
July 25, 2001
This thesis is a theoretical investigation of how money growth affects output,
employment, consumption and real wages from a supply side channel. We analyze the
effects of monetary shocks under deterministic and stochastic environments in a limited
participation model with competitive and sticky wages. We find that anticipated money
growth decreases output, employment, consumption, working capital and real wages,
but increases profitability of the firms. Unanticipated money growth under sticky wages
increases employment, output and consumption, decreases price and profits. The main
contribution of this thesis to the literature is that when sticky nominal wages are in-
cluded in a limited participation model with inelastic labor supply stylized business
cycle facts can be obtained.
Keywords: Limited participation models, Sticky wages, Supply side monetary trans-
mission mechanism.
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O¨ZET
PARASAL AKTARIM MEKANI˙ZMASININ ARZ YO¨NLU¨ SINIRLI KATILIMLI
BI˙R MODELI˙
Karaca, Zeynal
Yu¨ksek Lisans, I˙ktisat Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yrd. Doc¸. Dr. Erdem Bas¸c¸ı
Temmuz 25, 2001
Bu tez, para bu¨yu¨mesinin u¨retimi, istihdamı, tu¨ketimi ve reel u¨cretleri arz kanalıyla
nasıl etkileyebileceg˜ini teorik olarak incelemektedir. Bir kısıtlı katılım modelinde, fir-
maya uygulanan parasal transferlerin etkilerini deterministik ve stokastik durumlarda
ele almaktadır. Stokastik durumlar ic¸in, rekabetc¸i u¨cretler ile nominal sabit u¨cret
so¨zles¸meleri ayrı ayrı ele alınmaktadır. Beklenen para bu¨yu¨melerinin u¨retimi, istihdamı,
tu¨ketimi, is¸letme sermayesini ve reel u¨cretleri du¨s¸u¨rdu¨g˜u¨, fakat firmaların karlılıg˜ını
arttırdıg˜ı go¨zlenmektedir. U¨cretler sabitken, beklenmeyen para bu¨yu¨mesi istihdamı,
u¨retimi ve tu¨ketimi arttırmakta, fiyat ve karları du¨s¸u¨rmektedır. Bu tezin literature ana
katkısı, sabit nominal u¨cret so¨zles¸meleri altında, esnek olmayan is¸gu¨cu¨ arzına rag˜men
is¸ dalgalarının empirik o¨zellikleri elde edilebilmektedir.
Keywords: Kısıtlı katım modelleri, sabit u¨cret so¨zles¸meleri, arz yo¨nlu¨ parasal aktarım
mekanizması.
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1 Introduction
This thesis is a theoretical investigation of how money growth affects output, prices,
employment, consumption and real wages. This question has been studied in the liter-
ature under the heading of monetary transmission mechanism. The typical Keynesian
monetary transmission mechanism in textbooks, (e.g. Romer, 1996), indicates that the
monetary injections increase output via a demand side transmission mechanism. Money
growth stimulates total spending, which in turn bids up prices. Under sticky wages, as
a result of the increase in the price level, real wages decrease and hence employment
and total output increase. In our model, we show the effects of monetary injections
from a supply side channel, becasue the government injects the money to the economy
through the firm.
The stylized empirical observations about monetary shocks indicate that if a
contractionary shock on money is imposed, then aggregate output, profits and real
wages decrease, prices and interest rates increase (e.g. Christiano et al., 1997). These
observations are inconsistent with textbook monetary transmission theories. In order to
explain the movements in actual data, limited participation models have been studied
by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Fuerst (1992), Christiano et al (1997), Evans
and Marshall (1998), Christiano and Gust (1999), Cooley and Nam (1998), Cooley and
Vincenzo (1999).
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To assess the effects of exogenous shocks to monetary policy, we use a simplified
version of the limited participation model developed by Fuerst (1992). Fuerst (1992)
presents a competitive equilibrium model that captures the effects of monetary and
productivity shocks on interest rates, output, investment, consumption, prices and em-
ployment level. He argues that monetary injections decrease the cost of using cash to
finance production through the interest rate channel, because monetary injections are
made through loan market to the producers. In our thesis, there is no loan market and
money injections are directly made to the producers.
The limited participation model in Christiano et al. (1997), indicates that if
there is an unplausibly high labor supply elasticity (e.g. 2 percent) and a very high
markup rate (e.g. 40 percent), then, the limited participation models can account for
all stylized facts. Christiano et al. (1997, p.1204) conclude that: ‘...It seems important
to embed labor market frictions,which have the effects of mimicking a high elasticity
of labor supply into the current generation of limited participation models.’ although
they propose no formal model of labor market frictions. In this dissertation we take a
step to fill this gap.
Sticky wages have been widely considered in the literature in setups other than
the textbook Keynesian model as well. For example, Cho and Cooley (1997), Cooley
and Hansen (1998) and Folkertsma (1999) have studied the effects of money shocks
2
under sticky wages on output, consumption, prices and employment level.
In our thesis, we analyze the effects of monetary shocks under deterministic and
stochastic environments. In deterministic case, we find that the prices grow in the same
direction as money growth, but in the stochastic case we find the reverse effects of
money shocks on prices under sticky wages. Kydland and Prescott (1990, p.5) says,
quoted in Den Haan (2000), ‘...any theory in which procyclical prices figure crucially
in accounting for postwar business fluctuations is doomed to failure.’ In our thesis, we
find the countercyclical price movements due to monetary injections.
The remaining part of this thesis is organized as follows: In section 2, we discuss
the model under deterministic money growth. In section 3, we analyze a stochastic rep-
resentative agent model with flexible wages and competitive equilibrium, sticky wages
with persistent unemployment and sticky wages with occasional unemployment in se-
quence. In section 4, we discuss the results and make concluding remarks.
2 A Deterministic Representative Agent Model
Let us consider a representative family composed of three members; a father, a mother
and a son. At the beginning of the day, the family has a fixed amount of money, M .
The average money amount across all families will be denoted by M¯ . The father takes
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fraction, n of this money as working capital and the mother takes the remaining part of
it for shopping at the beginning of the day. The son goes out for work with no money.
Father has a factory but no labor force. Therefore, the father hires labor for production.
The son supplies labor and at the beginning of the day he receives a nominal wage at
rate W . Then, the produced goods are sold at the goods market. On the other hand,
the government steadily injects xM¯ amount of money every morning to the economy
through the firm. The exact amount of monetary injection is assumed to be known in
this section. At the end of the day, when the family members come back home, the
mother comes home with some amount of purchased goods and the money left over, if
any. The son comes home with his wage earnings and the father comes home with the
profit earnings.
In order to model this economy, we assume the family has a utility function
U(c)+V (1−L) where U(c), utility from consumption, is increasing and strictly concave
(U ′(c) > 0, U ′′(c) < 0) and V (1−L), utility from leisure, is also increasing and concave
(V ′(1− L) > 0, V ′′(1− L) ≤ 0). Here, c and L denote consumption and hours worked
respectively. Bellman’s equation for the representative family for given wages, prices,
initial money balances and money growth rate can be written as follows:
J(m) = max
n
{max
c,L,H
{U(c) + V (1− L) + βJ(m′)}}
subject to
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m ≥ n ≥ 0
m− n ≥ pc
n+ x ≥ wH
1 ≥ L ≥ 0
m′ =
m+ x+ p(f(H)− c) + w(L−H)
1 + x
where m and m′ denote normalized money balances of current and next period respec-
tively, p and w are normalized prices and wage respectively. x denotes money growth
rate, H denotes labor demand, f(H) denotes the production function, f ′(H) > 0 and
f ′′(H) ≤ 0 and J(m) denotes the level of maximum lifetime of utility of a representative
family with initial money balance M . The normalization is done by dividing the rele-
vant nominal variable by the per family average beginning of period money balances,
M¯ , i.e. w = W
M¯
, p = P
M¯
, m = M
M¯
, m′ = M
′
M¯ ′ where M¯
′ is the average money balance per
family in the next period.
For a given constant money growth rate x, a competitive equilibrium for this
economy is a list of functions of m, {J, n, c,m′, H, L}, a price p and a wage w, such
that
1. J solves the Bellman Equation given above,
2. n, c,m′, H, L solves the right hand side of the same Bellman Equation,
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3. Money market is in equilibrium, m(1) = m′(1) = 1, goods market is in
equilibrium, c(1) = f(H(1)), and labor market is in equilibrium, L(1) = H(1).
The Lagrangean of this maximization problem can be written as,
L(c, L,H, n, λ1, λ2) = U(c) + V (1− L) + βJ(m+ x+ p(f(H)− c) + w(L−H)
1 + x
)
+λ1(m− n− pc) + λ2(n+ x− wh)
where λ1 and λ2 are the shadow values of money in consumption and production re-
spectively. In this formulation, we guess that only two choice variables, n and L, will
take on interior values and hence, λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0 are the Lagrangean multipliers of
the second and third constraints respectively. Let U(c) = ln(c), the production function
f(H) = H, and the leisure utility function V (1 − L) = 1 − L. There are three mar-
kets in this economy: the money market, the labor market and the goods market. In
equilibrium, all these must clear. Hence we have the following equilibrium conditions:
m = m′ = 1, f(H) = c, H = L. Solving the Envelope Condition, together with the
first order conditions with respect to choice variables and shadow variables will provide
us the following solution:
n =
β − x(1 + x)
1 + x+ β
(1)
w =
(1− n)(1 + x)
β
=
(1 + x)3
(β)(1 + x+ β)
(2)
H =
n+ x
w
= (
β
1 + x
)2(3)
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L = H = (
β
1 + x
)2(4)
p =
1− n
c
=
1− n
H
=
(1 + x)4
β2(1 + x+ β)
(5)
When the results are analyzed, it will be easily noticed that n is decreasing in
x. Note that as the money growth rate is reduced towards the Friedman rule, that is
x = β − 1, working capital, n, increases to its maximum, in order to compensate the
taxation required for negative money growth. Similarly, the effects of x on real wages
w/p and labor demand L can be determined. We have obtained from the solution of
equilibrium that β
1+x
f ′(L) = w
p
and L = ( β
1+x
)2. As it can be seen from these two
equations, anticipated money growth, x, has negative effects both on real wages and
equilibrium employment.
Likewise, the profit of the firm is also affected by the monetary surprise injections.
Let Π denote the profit function such that Π = p.f(H) − wH. We can find the profit
by using the equation (2), (4), (5) as follows:
pi =
(1 + x)(1 + x− β)
(1 + x+ β)
(6)
As it can be seen from equation (6), a one time monetary injection increases the
equilibrium profit at the expense of real wages.
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3 A Stochastic Representative Agent Model
In this section, we will assume a random component to monetary injections (or taxes),
Xt. The exact amount of Xt will be learned by the family members after they have
seperated from home with their money balances. We will analyze the stochastic case of
our model under two subsections. In the first part, the case of competitive equilibrium
will be analyzed. This will be a simplified version of Fuerst (1992). In the second
part, we will impose the sticky wages. This second part will be studied under two
sections; the first section will investigate the case of persistent unemployment that is
the case of relatively high wages and the other section will examine the case of occasional
unemployment.
3.1 Competitive Equilibrium
Let us assume the monetary shocks are unanticipated. Unlike the deterministic case,
let’s assume further that the leisure is not valued by any agent so that labor is supplied
inelastically and therefore anticipated money growth does not effect employment and
output.
Let s denote the state of nature and pi(s) denote the probability density function
of s. We will assume monetary policy, x(s), will depend on s. Then the representative
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agent’s maximization problem can be written as follows:
J(m) = max
n
{∑
s
pi(s){ max
c(s),H(s)
{U(c(s)) + βJ(m′(s))}}
subject to, for all s
m− n(m) ≥ p(s)c(s)
n(m) + x(s) ≥ w(s)H(s)
m′(s) =
m+ x(s) + p(s)(f(H(s))− c(s)) + w(s)(L(s)−H(s))
1 + x(s)
Notice here that the consumption and labor demand are determined after the monetary
injection while n is determined before the uncertainity is resolved. Assuming both
cash in advance constraints will bind, let us put the values of c(s) = m−n(m)
p(s)
and
H(s) = n(m)+x(s)
w(s)
into m′ and then plug these new values in objective function. Also
imposing inelastic labor supply L(s) = 1 for all S, the objective function will become:
J(m) = max
n
{∑
s
pi(s){U(m− n(m)
p(s)
) + βJ(
p(s)f(n(m)−x(s)
w(s)
) + w(s)
1 + x(s)
}}
Then the first order condition of the representative agent’s problem is
∑
s
pi(s){−U
′(c(s))
p(s)
+
βp(s)
1 + x(s)
1
w(s)
f ′(
n+ x(s)
w(s)
)J ′(m′)} = 0
and the envelope condition is as follows:
J ′(m) =
∑
s
pi(s)
U ′(c(s))
p(s)
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Let U(c(s)) = ln(c(s)), f(H(s)) = θH(s). After imposing the equlibrium conditions,
m = m′ = 1, f(H(s)) = c(s), H(s) = L(s) = 1, in the first order condition, together
with the envelope condition, we have the following result:
1 = β
∑
s
pi(s){ 1− n(1)
(n(1) + x(s))(1 + x(s))
}
From here we can find the value of n(1). Once the value of n(1) is found, the
rest of the equilibrium will be easily solved. After imposing the equilibrium conditions,
we obtain prices as p(s) = 1−n(1)
θ
, consumption as c(s) = θH(s) = θ and the wages as
w(s) = n(1) + x(s). We can also find the profit function in terms of s. Let Π(s) denote
the profit function. Then Π(s) = p(s)f(H(s)) − w(s)H(s) = 1 − 2n(1) − x(s). As it
can be seen from here, the profit depends negatively on the value of x(s).
Let us solve for numerical values for x(s). Let x(s) = 0.1 with probability 0.5
and x(s) = −0.1 with probability 0.5. Then we can find the value of n as follows:
n(1) ≈ { β
2(1 + β)
}+ {
√
β2 − 0.04β(1 + β)
2(1 + β)
}
Then, the price, consumption, wages and the profit can be easily calculated from the
equations derived above for these numeric values of n(1). Notice here that output,
prices, consumption, employment are not affected by surprise money growth, while
nominal and real wages are positively dependent on money shocks.
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3.2 Persistent Unemployment
If nominal wages are negotiated at the beginning of each period before knowing the
monetary shock, then W cannot depend on s. We will call such wage contracts as
sticky wages. In this subsection, we will suppose that the sticky wages are set so high
that persistent unemployment occurs. We will relax this relatively high sticky wage
assumption in the next section. The representative agent’s maximization problem will
be as follows:
J(m) = max
n
{∑
s
pi(s){ max
c(s),H(s)
{U(c(s)) + βJ(m′)}}}
subject to, for all s
m− n = p(s)c(s)
n(m) + x(s) = w¯H(s)
1−H(s) ≥ 0
m′ =
m+ x(s) + p(s)(f(H(s))− c(s)) + w¯(L(s)−H(s))
1 + x(s)
Let λ3(s) be the langrange multipliers of the third constraint, i.e. the full employment
constraint. Since third constraint is taken as strict inequality, it is obvious that λ3(s) will
be zero. If we eliminate c(s) and H(s) using the first two cash in advance constraints,
our choice variable will only be n(m). After imposing the first and the second equations
of our constraint into m′ and objective function, we can easily solve for the equilibrium.
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The first order condition of the representative agent’s problem, evaluated at equilibrium,
is;
∑
s
pi(s){−U
′(c(s))
p(s)
+
p(s)βθ
(w¯)(1 + x(s))
J ′(m′)} = 0(7)
The envelope condition, then will be;
J ′(m) =
∑
s
pi(s)
U ′(c(s))
p(s)
(8)
Let U(c(s)) = ln(c(s)), f(H(s)) = θH(s). There are again three markets in this
economy: the money market, the labor market and the goods market. In equilibrium,
money and goods market clear but labor supply is rationed at the level of labor demand.
That is, we have: m = m′ = 1, f(H(s)) = c(s), H(s) = L(s) ≤ 1. The similar
disequilibrium models are studied in Bennasy (1995) and Folkerstma (1999).
When we impose these equilibrium conditions into (8), after some calculations
we obtain J ′(m) = 1
1−n(1) and J
′(1) = 1
1−n(1) . Using this result together with (7), we
have
1 =
∑
s
pi(s){ 1− n(1)
(1 + x(s))(n+ x(s))
}(9)
Once we found the value of n(1) from the equation (9), then the rest of the equilibrium
will be easly solved. After imposing the equilibrium conditions, we can find the following
results:
H(s) =
n(1) + x(s)
w¯
(10)
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c(s) = θH(s) = θ
n(1) + x(s)
w¯
(11)
p(s) =
1− n(1)
n(1) + x(s)
w¯
θ
(12)
Π(s) = p(s)f(H(s)− w¯H(s) = 1− 2n(1)− x(s)(13)
As it can be seen from the equation (9), the demand for working capital, n, does
not depend on w¯ since p also increases with w¯ to leave the real wage w¯
p
, unaffected by
w¯. In contrast to working capital n(1), employment, output and consumption depend
negatively on the nominal wage rate. For employment to be feasible, H(s) ≤ 1, for all
s. This requires a high wage contract, w¯ ≥ n(1) +max(x(s)).
The decrease in price level with money injections is obtained from equation (12).
To determine behaviour of consumption, labor demand and profit against monetary
injections, let’s look at their partial derivatives with respect to x(s).
∂H(s)
∂x(s)
=
1
w¯
> 0, ∀ s(14)
∂c(s)
∂x(s)
=
θ
w¯
> 0, ∀ s(15)
∂Π(s)
∂x(s)
< 0, ∀ s(16)
The reason for an increase in labor demand is quite intiutive. We know that there is
a persistent unemployment due to highly setted wage contracts. If the producers are
provided with subsidies, that is x(s) is positive, then they will have more resource to
hire more labor force. Hence, the labor demand will increase and the unemployment
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level will decrease.
Similar to the labor demand, the consumption will also move in the same di-
rection with the movement in x(s). The higher the amount of money injection, x(s),
the more labor force is employed and therefore the more goods are produced and sold
pulling down the price level. The source of decrease in profit is mainly coming from
labor market. The total labor cost has increased, but there is no increase in nominal
sales revenue, because the consumers have the same amount of money. The prices de-
crease at the same percentage rate of increase in produced goods, hence the total sales
revenue remains intact. Therefore profits are decreasing with positive money injections
and increasing with negative money injections.
Let x(s) = 0.1 with probability 0.5 and x(s) = −0.1 with probability 0.5.
From the equation (10) we can find n(1) as follows :
n(1) ≈ { β
2(1 + β)
}+ {
√
β2 − 0.04β(1 + β)
2(1 + β)
}(17)
Therefore, even under sticky wages, working capital has the same level as competitive
equilibrium, in the previous section. Then, the price, consumption, wages and the profit
can be easily calculated from the equations derived above for these numeric values of
n(1). Real wages and profits turn out to be the same as those in competitive equilibrium.
But here, prices fluctuate instead of nominal wages.
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3.3 Occasional Unemployment
Let us again assume the sticky wages. But now, wages are set at a relatively lower
value such that only occasional unemployment may occur conditional upon the money
injections. Note that, in our model the nominal wages may fluctuate between each
periods, but the normalized wages, w¯ = W/M¯, remain constant within each period.
Then the representative agent’s maximization problem will be as follow:
J(m) = max
n
{∑
s
pi(s){ max
c(s),H(s)
{U(c(s)) + βJ(m′)}}}
subject to, for all s
m− n ≥ p(s)c(s)
n(m) + x(s) ≥ w¯H(s)
1−H(s) ≥ 0
m′ =
m+ x(s) + p(s)(f(H(s))− c(s)) + w¯(L(s)−H(s))
1 + x(s)
Let λ1(s), λ2(s) and λ3(s) be the Langrange multipliers of the first three constraints
respectively. Then the first order conditions of the representative agent’s problem are;
−∑
s
pi(s)λ1(s) +
∑
s
pi(s)λ2(s) = 0(18)
U ′(c(s))− p(s)λ1(s)− p(s)βJ
′(m′)
1 + x(s)
= 0(19)
{p(s)f
′(H(s))− w¯
1 + x(s)
}βJ ′(m′)− w¯λ2(s)− λ3(s) = 0(20)
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m− n(m)− p(s)c(s) ≥ 0, with equality if λ1(s) > 0(21)
n(m) + x(s)− w¯H(s) ≥ 0, with equality if λ2(s) > 0(22)
1−H(s) ≥ 0, with equality if λ3(s) > 0(23)
Let U(c(s)) = ln(c(s)), f(H(s)) = θH(s). There are three markets in this economy:
the money market, the labor market and the goods market. In equilibrium, all these
except labor market must clear. Hence we have the following equilibrium conditions:
m = m′ = 1, f(H(s)) = c(s), H(s) = L(s) ≤ 1. The solution of the maximization
problem is conditional upon states.1 There exists s, such that λ1(s) > 0, λ2(s) =
0 and λ3(s) > 0 and for other s’ s, λ1(s) > 0, λ2(s) > 0 and λ3(s) = 0. The
envelope condition is
J ′(m) =
∑
s
pi(s)
U ′(c(s))
p(s)
(24)
When we impose the equilibrium conditions into (24), after some manipulation we
obtain J ′(m) = 1
m−n(m) and J
′(m′) = 1
m′−n(m′) . Using this result together with (19),
we have
λ1(s) =
1
m− n(m) −
β
1 + x(s)
1
m′ − n(m′)(25)
From (9), together with the (24) and the equilibrium conditions, we can find the value
1The model that we have developed in this section includes occasinally binding constraints. The
solution to such models are studied in Christiano and Fisher (2000).
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of λ2(s) as
λ2(s) =
p(s)θ − w¯
1 + x(s)
β
w¯
1
m′ − n(m′)(26)
From (18), together with (25)and (26), we can write the following equation
∑
s
pi(s){ 1
m− n(m) −
β
1 + x(s)
1
m′ − n(m′)} =
∑
s
pi(s){p(s)θ − w¯
1 + x(s)
β
w¯
1
m′ − n(m′)}(27)
From the first constraint we can find p(s) = m−n(m)
C(s)
. After imposing the equlibrium
conditions, m = m′ = 1, f(H(s)) = c(s), H(s) = L(s), with the obtained value p(s),
we can find from the equation (27):
∑
s
pi(s){1− β
1 + x(s)
} =∑
s
pi(s){ 1− 2n(1)− x(s)
(1 + x(s))(n(1) + x(s))
β}(28)
When we solve for the value of n(1) from the equation (28), we can easily char-
acterize the equilibrium of this economy. We can easily express prices, labor demand,
consumption and profit of the firms in terms of the monetary injections, x(s). These
values will be as follows:
H(s) = min{n(1) + x(s)
w¯
, 1}(29)
p(s) =
1− n(1)
c(s)
(30)
c(s) = θH(s)(31)
Π(s) = p(s)f(H(s))− w¯H(s)(32)
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Let x(s) = 0.1 with probability 0.5 and x(s) = −0.1 with probability 0.5.
From the equation (28)we can find n(1) as follows:
n(1) ≈ 1.02− 0.202β
3.64− 2.02β(33)
Then, the price, consumption, wages and the profit can be easily calculated from the
equations derived above for this numerical value of n(1). In contrast with the persistent
unemployment case, here output and prices fluctuate less. Other qualitative features of
equilibrium are the same.
In our thesis, we analyzed the effects of monetary shocks under deterministic
and stochastic environments. In section 2, we discussed the model under deterministic
money growth. Here, we found that the prices grow in the same direction as money
growth. In section 3, we analyzed a stochastic representative agent model with flexible
wages and competitive equilibrium, sticky wages with persistent unemployment and
sticky wages with occasional unemployment in sequence. In the stochastic case we
found the reverse effects of money shocks on prices under sticky wages.
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4 Conclusion
In this thesis, we studied the effects of monetary growth on output, prices, employment,
consumption and real wages in a general equilibrium framework. When the money
growth is anticipated, we found real wages, employment, output, working capital, con-
sumption are all decreasing with money growth while profitability is increasing. Money
injections decrease labor supply and hence aggregate output. When money injection
rate is reduced to Friedman rule, then, the first best is attained.
In the third part, we analyzed the effects of unanticipated money shocks on
output, employment, prices, wages and profit. We found that under the competitive
equilibrium case, prices of goods, consumption level and labor demand are unaffected
by monetary shocks. Nominal wages move in the same direction with the monetary
shocks. Money injections increase nominal wages and hence the real wages. As a result
of increase in total labor cost the profit of the firms decreases.
Under sticky nominal wages, when the wage rate is set relatively high before the
uncertainity of money shocks resolved, we observed persistent unemployment. If per-
sistent unemployment occurs, then, positive money shocks increase the labor demand,
consumption level and total output. Suprisingly the profit is decreasing with suprise
money, because the sales revenue does not change, the prices decrease and real wages
increase. Nevertheless, the value of real wages here is the same as the value of real
19
wages under competitive equilibrium.
On the other hand, when the wages are set relatively at lower value, then, there
exixsts occasional unemployment. Labor demand is rationed after high money shocks.
It takes the minimum value of {n(1)+x(s)
w¯
, 1}. In the range of low suprise money growth,
money injections increase the employment level, hence the total output increases. Prices
decrease and consumption level increases. However, in the range of relatively higher
suprise money growth, money injections do not alter the employment level, consumption
level, prices and profit rate.
In an influential empirical study, Cochrane (1998) points out that, in interpret-
ing the evidence from VARs, with a view point that anticipated money growth reduces
output while unanticipated money schocks increase it, makes more sense than a model
without these attributes. In this dissertation, we introduce a model with such a fea-
ture. Moreover, the model allows for involuntary unemployment over business cycle
fluctuations, a need pointed out in the literature on limited participation models of the
monetary transmission mechanism.
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